Peter Mlakar

13.09.2006 |




We have a cloned subobject and its original. Our intention is to find out if the clone has the consciousness of the self which is identical with the consciousness of the subject, the carrier of the mother cell. Is it possible in the cloning process with identical bodily attributes to thus also create the same consciousness as that of the original? Furthermore, are there any differences between the identical and the same? Is the same consciousness not yet identical, therefore the selves differ? If it was their identity that was in question, we can conclude that through a chain of cloning of one and the same original, by repetition of the same being, it is possible to create an individual’s immortality. It is thus an experiment in which we are clarifying whether or not it is possible to artificially create an immortal soul.


It was said that we have at our disposal a subject of natural origin which is being cloned, and it needs to be found out whether or not its copy is the same person as the original. The only way we can verify this is if the original dies or is killed, whereby in the case of violent death we find out that it does not care; because it is convinced that it is going to continue to live as a clone. We can prove the sameness or non-sameness of the consciousness of the original and the clone by having the original write a sentence before it dies and say only the first part of it; the second part is saved on an encoded disc. The clone, to prove the sameness of its consciousness with the original, has to say the second part of the same sentence without knowing what the original had written.


In the case that it is proven that the cloned person has the same self as its original, we can conclude that empirical human immortality can be created by an artificial method. If the opposite is true – if we find out that the cloned person is not identical with the original – we continue with the research. We research what is it that actually happens to the soul of the clone, its consciousness. We are faced with the question of its identity, in the last consequence of its moral consciousness. We research whether the self of the cloned person is something new, something independent from the material generic substance, from the substance of the original, and whether it exists at all. Another question poses itself here, namely, the cloned subject’s claim that it has a soul, that it has a consciousness, can turn out to be something unprovable, unverifiable. We can hit against the fact that the leap from the finite into the infinite by human intervention is impossible.


If we presuppose or find out that the cloned person’s consciousness/psyche is not identical with the original’s, if it is not identical in the sense of referential identity, or more, if we presuppose the possibility that it does not have a soul at all, this can have interesting consequences. Namely, if the soul is merely “it alone”, something which surpasses the final material genetic record, which dictates the future structure of a living being, and its non-existence implies, for example, the inability to differentiate between good and evil, if we find out that artificial “people”, created in biotechnological, chemical-physical or cyber-digital processes, do not reach the psychical qualities of a natural human being, we can perform on them or with them as-yet-unknown activities. In case the conclusion, that these beings are actually not conscious of the existence of evil, is possible, but they have at the same time certain bodily-sensorial functions better developed than natural human beings, these subobjects are very applicable; in the same way as the tools, samples or elements for the production of intensified sexual sensations with the “real” person.


However, we need to allow the possibility that the absence of a soul does not necessarily eliminate the absence of pleasure. According to what was said before we can formulate a hypothesis: if the aforementioned subobjects do not have a soul, if consciousness of the finite and the infinite, consciousness of good and evil is eliminated, they are not subject to moral-ethical principles and can thus become truly lovely toys. These beings are entertaining and bring happiness to their human partners, they are always at the disposal of sexual engineering and various cybernetic interventions into their bodies; by experimenting on them and intensifying their sexual substance, the original, the natural human being -- as long as it still exists (there is a possibility that in the end, if cloning should prove effective in terms of relative human immortality, the majority of beings in the universe will be copies without the original) -- so the original also develops, upgrades, surpasses its own natural sexual essence, has the knowledge and material for it.


Therefore the founding of a research center in which individuals, created by the natural reproductive method, i.e., the originals, their copies/clones and non-humans produced in other processes are subjected to scientific-technological procedures with the purpose of development, intensification of that segment of their being which plays the most important part in the process of distinguishing between good and evil – the sexual organism. In these processes the natural anatomy of the body and physiology of the central nervous system are being developed or upgraded; these are, among other things, experiments in which we are to find out how and whether it is possible, by means of electromagnetic causality of informative and stimulative units or elements, to engage the processuality of the nervous system in the sense of enhancement of its cognitivity and sensitivity. That is, to find out whether by being built into a human body, the carriers of information, logical-mathematical processes in digital systems can improve our natural mental abilities, increase the ability of the perceptual apparatus and nerve substance as regards the intensification of the effects of sexual functions.


According to predictions, there will be computers in the future which will have the ability to think as humans do. Furthermore, in the end, non-biological intelligence will be more developed than human intelligence. However, the only criterion and proof of real intelligence is its self-consciousness. The question that poses itself here is: will a computer be able to be conscious of its own existence? Let us presuppose that in all our tests of consciousness it will answer correctly to all our questions, that all its outputs by which it will try to prove its consciousness, from which we can infer its existence, will be identical with the outputs of a real human being. But on the same disc that was mentioned before, there is also the form of the proof whether or not a computer has a consciousness. If its answer is the same as the verifying sentence on the disc, we will continue to think about its intellect.


In collaboration with: ERVIN MARKOŠEK

Read more (Text Maska (pdf) with article written about the artist)